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Some Aspects of the Decision-Making
Process in the European Communities
FrancisCrijns *

I.

INTRODUCTION

The European Community finds itself in a state of almost permanent
crisis as the process of integration continues to stagnate; all of its noble
objectives still to be realized; and since 1958, bedevilled with many new
problems, especially in the areas of environmental and energy policy.
Furthermore, the socio-economic situation has changed fundamentally
with the enlargement of the Community to ten member states in 1981
which has weakened rather then strengthened the possibilities to cope
with these difficulties. In addition to these general considerations, institutional factors, such as the procedures according to which decisions are
made in the Communities and the role of the Council, the Commission
and the European Parliament also contribute to this state of malaise.
In this article, I shall focus attention on two of these institutional
problems namely (1) the alleged paralysis of decision-making in the
Communities,' and (2) the attribution of legislative power claimed by the
European Parliament. 2 In the first part of this article, I shall describe
how decisions are made according to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty).' I shall then discuss its actual development, dwelling on the production of decisions by the Council
• Lecturer on Constitutional Law, University of Tilburg, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
1 Kapteyn & Verloren Van Themaat, De uitbreiding van de Europese Gemeenschappen, 1972
SOCIAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 323, 333.
2 The Resolution of July 6, 1982, on the European Parliament's position concerning the reform
of the Treaties, suggests that the Council and Parliament jointly exercise legislative power on the
basis of the Commission's proposals or on their own initiative. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 238) 25,
27, para. 7 (1982).
3 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
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and the Commission. I conclude this section of the article by arguing
that there is no paralysis of the decision-making process in the Communities, at least not when one looks at the volume of the decisions. If there
is a problem, then it is rather of a qualitative kind. To correct this qualitative failure, I have suggested that the non-application of the Treaty
provision of a majority voting rule should be eliminated.
In the second part of the article, I shall examine the claim of the
European Parliament (EP) that it should receive colegislative power
within the decision-making process. I shall first outline the powers of the
EP according to the EEC Treaty and then review, as far as decisionmaking is concerned, the different proposals for improvement that have
been published in the past few years. I shall deal with a number of arguments against granting legislative power to the European Parliament.
Here, my major thesis is that an attribution of legislative power to the
European Parliament would be wrong for two main reasons. First, because it would be contrary to the constitutional evolution in the Member
States, and it would not fit in the institutional system of the EEC Treaty.
And second, because the extension of legislative power to the EP would
add an extra obstacle to the already rather difficult decision-making procedure in the European Community.
II.

THE ALLEGED PARALYSIS OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Some scholars have alleged that decision-making within the Community has been paralyzed 4 or inevitably will be blocked 5 while others
6
have argued the opposite, that the Community is trying to do too much.
To evaluate these conflicting statements, it is necessary to examine the
formal structure of decision-making as spelled out in the EEC Treaty and
how it operates in actual practice.
A.

Decision-Making Procedure According to the EEC Treaty
1. Position of the Council

The EEC Treaty provides three different voting procedures for deci7
sion-making by the Council: decisions can be taken by unanimous vote;
4 See Kapteyn & Verloren Van Themaat, supra note 1.
5 Mathijesen, Enkele Jurisdische Aspecten van Een Toedring, 1977 NIEUW EUROPA (No. 3)
139.
6 COMMITrEE OF THREE TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, REPORT ON EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 46 (1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMITrEE OF THREE REPORT].
7 Article 100 of the EEC Treaty provides that: "[t]he Council shall, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down
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or by a qualified majority;8 or by a simple majority.9 As a rule, when
treaty provisions do not specify that unanimous or a qualified voting procedure is required, then decisions are taken by a majority of the Council
members.'o But, since the Treaty provides in most cases for decisions to
be taken unanimously or by a qualified majority, decision-making by the
Council by simple majority vote is not the rule but the exception.
A closer look at the Treaty shows that the types of decisions in
which the Treaty provides for a qualified majority is higher than those in
which a qualified majority is prescribed after the second stage of the transitional period or after the transitional period." Moreover, it also appears that the Treaty always requires unanimity only for the most
important decisions.' 2 However, the unanimity requirement, in most of
these cases, is not quite so obvious. Article 235 is one example. ' 3 There
are in fact some decisions where this requirement is self-evident, because
they cover questions which materially involve either the Community's
constitutive power or its relations with other persons in international
law, ' 4 or can be considered, as in the case of article 235, as "para-constituent."' 5 But in other cases, for example articles 51 and 100 mentioned
above, and also in many other Treaty regulations,1 6 this argument does
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the Common Market." EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 100.
8 Article 43, paragraph 2, of the EEC Treaty provides that: "[t]he Council shall, on a proposed
from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, acting unanimously during the first two
stages, and by a qualified majority thereafter, make regulations, issue directives, or take decisions,
without prejudice to any recommendations it may also make." Id. art. 43, para. 2.
9 Article 143, paragraph 1, of the EEC Treaty provides that: "[slave as otherwise provided in
this Treaty, the Council shall act by a majority of its members." Id. art. 148, para. 1.
10 Id.

I I See, EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 44, para. 4; art. 55, para. 2; art. 70, para. 2; art. 79, para.
3; art. 93, para. 2; art. 94; art. 103, para. 3; art. 108, paras. 2, 3; art. 109, para. 3; art. 127; art. 203,
paras. 3, 5; art. 204, para. 2; art. 206.
12 See EEC Treaty,supra note 3, art. 4, para. 3; art. 51; art. 57, para. 2; art. 59; art. 75, para. 3;
art. 84, para. 2; art. 99; art. 100; art. 103, para. 2; art. 121; art. 126, sub. b; art. 136; art. 159; art. 160,
para. 2; art. 194; art. 206, para. 4; art. 209; art. 235; art. 236; art. 237; art. 238.
13 Article 235 of the EEC Treaty provides that: "[i]f action by the Community should prove
necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate
measures." EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 235.
14 See id. arts. 236, 237, 238. See also Report or the Working Party Examining the Problem of
the Enlargement of the Powers of the European Parliament, 5 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 4) 40 (Supp.
1972) [hereinafter cited as Vedel Report].
15 Vedel Report, supra note 14, at 41.
16 See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 57, para. 2; art. 59; art. 84, para. 2; art. 99; art. 100;
art. 103, para. 2; art. 121; art. 126, sub b; art. 136; art. 159, para. 2; art. 160, para. 2; art. 194; art.
206, para. 4; art. 209.
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not apply. Therefore, the necessity of a unanimous vote in these provisions is, in my opinion, less obvious.
Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority, the
votes of its members are weighted.' 7 In the Community of Ten, the big
member states (Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain) each possess
10 votes, The Netherlands, Belgium and Greece each have 5 votes, Denmark and Ireland each have 3 and Luxembourg has 2 votes.' 8 To make a
decision on a proposal from the Commission, 45 out of 63 votes are required.' 9 In other cases, the Treaty requires in addition that at least six
members of the Council vote in favor. 2' These Treaty provisions and the
special voting procedure of Article 149 are designed to strengthen the
position of the Commission and to protect the interests of the smaller
countries. In other words, it is not possible for the big member states
alone to deviate from a Commission proposal, because, under article 149
unanimity is required in that case. 2 ' Secondly, one can note that even
after the second enlargement, the big member states cannot outvote the
smaller ones since the treaty requires that the adoption of an act by a
qualified majority, cooperation of, at least, two smaller countries is
necessary.22

2.

The Position of the Commission

The protection of the Community's interest is vested in the CommisMoreover, the Treaty provides in most cases that the Council
makes a decision on a proposal from the Commission.24 Because of this
right to present proposals to the Council, the Commission has a key posision.2 3

17 "Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority, the votes of its members shall be
weighed as follows.
... Id., art. 148, para. 2.
18 Id., art. 148, para. 2.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. art. 149.
22 Speech by T. Van Rijn, Besuluitvorming-stechnieken in de Raad, Colloquium, University of
Leiden (Jan. 26, 1979), at 9.
23 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 155. See also, Merger Treaty, art. 10, 10 J.O. EUR. COMM.
(No. 152) 7 (1967)).
24 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall, in accordance with
the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions.
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
Id. art. 189.
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tion in the decision-making process of the Community. In fact, this
amounts to an exclusive right of initiative since the Council cannot take a
decision without a proposal from the Commission. This exclusive right
of initiative may be called the first principle on which the cooperation
between the Commission and the Council in the decision-making process
is based. Article 149, which is the cornerstone of the decision-making
machinery, contains two other principles: (1) the Commission can modify its proposal as long as the Council has not yet taken a decision, and
25
(2) the Council may only amend such a proposal unanimously.
In summary, article 149(1) has two functions. First, it ensures the
protection of the Community's interest by binding the Council in principle to the proposal of the Commission. If the Council wishes to dissociate itself from this proposal, it can only do so by unanimity. Second,
article 149(1) also protects the interests of the smaller member states,
which rests with the Commission. 26 So, in the decision-making system of
the Treaty, the Commission becomes the eleventh party-in addition to
the ten member states-during the discussions in the Council that lead to
a Council decision. As such, the Commission cannot only reconcile conflicting national claims but also bring these in line with the Community's
interests, of which the Commission is the guardian. Thus where decisions
by a qualified majority are required, the Commission can play the role of
27
an arbiter with, sometimes, decisive influence.
3. Position of the European Parliament
The EEC Treaty itself defines the position of the European Parliament as a weak one. Article 137 speaks of an "assembly" 2 8 with only
"advisory and supervisory powers." 2 9 Although the European Parliament is the first international parliament which is elected directly by the
voters,30 it is not a legislature and its part in the legislative process is only
25

EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 143, para. 2. See also P.

KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN

146 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT I].
26 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 143.
27 P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT I, supra note 25, at 147.
28 The Assembly named itself, in 1962, the "European Parliament." Resolution of March 30,
1962, J.O. EUR. COMM. 1045 (1962).
29 Article 137 of the EEC Treaty provides that, "[t]he Assembly, which shall consist of representatives or the peoples of the States brought together in the Community, shall exercise the advisory
and supervisory powers which are conferred upon it by this Treaty." EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art.
137.
30 Article 138 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States. Since June 1979, the date of the first
direct European elections, the E.P. has been composed of members elected every five years
THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
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an advisory one. In a recent judgment the Court of Justice of the EC
held that this advisory power "represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty. Although limited, it reflects at
Community level the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples
should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a
representative assembly."'"
The Vedel Report explained the weak position of the European Parliament by the fact that:
[T]he authors of the Treaties were more interested in the construction than
in the government of Europe, they did not give the Parliament a very important place among the Community institutions, no doubt thinking that
the matter would have to be reviewed when the time came: hence the legal
and political ambiguity of the European Parliament's position.32

The second part of this essay will further discuss the competence of the
European Parliament.3 3
B.

Actual Developments

The decision-making process in the Community has, in fact, developed differently from what should have taken place according to the
above-mentioned Treaty provisions.
The intended transition from the unanimity rule to the majority
rule, for example, with respect to the agricultural policy, 34 the transport
policy3 5 and the external trade policy 36 has never taken place. Majority
decisions are, in fact, an exception and for the rest hardly any voting
takes place within the Council. Discussions go on and on until an agreethrough universal suffrage. The E.P. has now 434 members: 81 from each of the countries with
the largest population, 25 from the Netherlands, 24 from Belgium, 24 from Greece, 16 from
Denmark, 15 from Ireland and 6 from Luxemburg.
Id. art. 138, para. 3.
31 S.A. Roquette Freres v. Council of the European Communities, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
3333, 3360; see also Maizena GmbH v. Council of the European Communities, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 3393.
32 Vedel Report, supra note 14, at 29.
33 See infra notes 112-125 and accompanying text.
34 Article 43 provides that; "[t]he Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the Assembly, acting unanimously during the first two stages and by a qualified majority
thereafter, make regulations, issue directives or take decisions. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 43,
para. 2.
35 Article 75 of the EEC Treaty provides that; "[flor the purpose of implementing Article 74,
and taking into account the distinctive features of transport, the Council shall, acting unanimously
Id. art. 75,
until the end of the second stage and by a qualified majority thereafter, lay down.
para. 1.
36 Article 112 of the EEC Treaty provides that; "[o]n a proposal from the Commission, the
Council shall, acting unanimously until the end of the second stage and by a qualified majority
thereafter, issue any directives needed for this purpose." Id. art. 112, para. 1.
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ment is reached. 7 This practice has been applied since the enactment of
the EEC Treaty in 1958, but it became the subject of a "constitutional"
crisis in 1965 during the transition from the second to the third stage of
the transitional period. 8 For many decisions this transition involved a
change from the unanimity rule to the qualified majority rule.3 9
1.

The Luxemburg Compromise of January 1966

The constitutional crisis of 1965 was provoked by the Commission's
proposals on the financing of the common agricultural policy (CAP). 4'
The Hallsstein-Commission had proposed a revision of the Community's
financial structure, the crucial elements of which were the creation of its
own resources for the Community and making these resources subject to
extended budgetary powers of the EP.4 1 The beginning of the third stage
of the transitional period on January 1, 1966 implied that the CAP could
from then on be decided by a qualified majority of the Council.4 2 France
declared its opposition to the application of the majority rule when a vital
interest of a member state is at stake, called into question the position of
the Commission and boycotted the Council's session and all meetings of
working groups.43 The crisis was discussed in a special session of the
Council and resulted in the so-called "Agreement of Luxemburg."'
Strictly speaking it is incorrect to refer to this as an "agreement," because there was no agreement between the six member states. The compromise records the agreement of all the member states that, on matters
where a decision that could be taken by majority vote on a proposal from
the Commission would affect very important interests of one or more
partners, the members of the Council will endeavour to reach a unanimous decision, within a reasonable time. The French delegation felt,
however, that where very important interests are at stake the discussion
must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached. This difference of opinion is noted but not settled in the Compromise.4 5
37 See Van Rijn, supra note 22, at 7; cf Vedel Report, supra note 14, at 26.
38 P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT I, supra note 25, at 144.
39 E.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 43, para. 2, 56, para. 2, 69 and 75. In other cases the

transition from the unanimity rule to the qualified majority rule should already take place after the
first stage of the transitional period, e.g. , id. arts. 54, para. 2, 57, para. 1 and 63, para. 2.
40 P. KAPETYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INLEIDING TOT HET RECHT VAN DE
EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN 18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT II].
41 E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
IN PERSPECTIVE 63-64 (1976).
42 See supra note 34.
43 9 BULL. EUR. COMM. 5 (1966).

44 Id. See also P. VAN THEMAAT I, supra note 25, at 144.
45 Vedel Report, supra note 14, at 26; see also Richard Mayne, The Times (London), May 24,
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The Vedel Report still contains an unexcelled outline of the consequences of the Luxemburg Compromise. In chapter III regarding the
institutions and current practice in the light of the tasks awaiting the
Community the report points out that:
[t]he consequence of this document has been that in practice not only
France but other Member States too, invoking the principle of reciprocity,
have refered in various cases to the concept of "very important interests"
and this has meant that the principle of unanimity has been generally applied . . . What is in question is the practice of votes hardly ever being
taken in the Council (except on budgetary matters). At all levels-experts,
Permanent Representatives, Ministers-all procedures except that of unanimous agreement have been rejected in advance, without any reference to
the importance of national interests at stake in each case. This practice
does not enhance the Council's power to take decisions, not so much because it prevents majority decisions, but because, in rejecting this possibility, it robs discussions of a stimulus which could help efforts to bring
together differing points of view and leads to a certain indifference over the
search for solutions. It also affects the institutional balance. Once it has
been accepted that decisions in Council always require unanimous agreement, the Commission's proposals lose the privilege granted them by Article 149 of the EEC Treaty. This has affected the Commission's activities.
The dose of innovation which could and normally should be included in its
proposals is likely to be sacrificed in the search for solutions which will
meet with unanimous approval. . . . The division of work required by the
Treaties is thus impaired.4 6
The discussions within the Council are taking more and more the character of intergovernmental negotiations in which there is no longer a place
for the independent and separate role of the Commission.4 7
On May 17 and 18, 1982, the Council's decisions fixing agricultural
prices were finally adopted by a qualified majority.4 8 It is still too early
to say whether the Luxemburg Compromise will remain the basis for the
decision-making process in the Council and if so, whether the function of
"vital interests" in that process will remain unchanged? In the Solemn
Declaration on European Union, signed in Stuttgart on June 19, 1983, it
is said that:
[T]he application of the decision-making procedures laid down in the Treaties of Paris and Rome is of vital importance in order to improve the European Communities' capacity to act. Within the Council every possible
means of facilitating the decision-making process will be used, including, in
cases when unanimity is required, the possibility of abstaining from
1982, at 11, col. 5 (letter to the editor) who calls the "Luxemburg Compromise" not a compromise
but a contradiction.
46 Vedel Report, supra note 14, at 26-27.
47 Van Rijn, supra note 22, at 11.
48 16 GEN. REPORT EUR. COMM. 24 (1982).
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49

But from the declarations to the official report made at the Stuttgart
Summit, it appears that, of the ten member states, only five countries
(Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany and Italy) accept the
rules of the Treaty in the matter of voting procedures; three countries
(Great Britain, Denmark and Greece) demand, contrary to the Treaty,
unanimity when a vital interest is at stake; and two countries (France and
Ireland) hide behind the point of view that a decision should be postponed when such an interest comes into play, which in fact also comes
down to unanimity.10 5 1 So the situation in the Council with regard to the
voting procedure has in fact deteriorated and the majority decision about
agricultural prices of May, 1982 cannot, therefore, be seen as the beginning of a structural change.
2.

The European Council

The establishment of the European Council in 1974 is connected, on
the one hand, with the inadequacy of the Treaty mechanism concerning
social and economic policies and on the other hand with the evolution of
the cooperation between the member states in the field of foreign policy
which is not covered by the EEC Treaty. The objectives of the European
Council are summarized as follows in the Solemn Declaration on European Union, signed in Stuttgart on June 19, 1983, stating that:
[t]he European Council brings together the Heads of State or Government
and the President of the Commission assisted by the Foreign Ministers of
the Member States and a member of the Commission. In the perspective of
European Union, the European Council:
-provides a general political impetus to the construction of Europe;
-defines approaches to further the construction of Europe and issues general political guidelines for the European Communities and European
Political Cooperation;
-deliberates upon matters concerning European Union in its different aspects with due regard to consistency among them;
-solemnly expresses the common position in questions of external
relations;
-initiates cooperation in new areas of activity.
When the European Council acts in matters within the scope of the
European Communities, it does so in its capacity as the Council within the
meaning of the Treaties. The European Council will address a report to the
European Parliament after each of its meetings. This report will be
presented at least once during each Presidency by the President of the European Council. The European Council will also address a written annual
49 16 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 26 (1983).
50 See EUROPE (No. 3633), June 20, 1983, at 3.
51 See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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report to the European Parliament on progress towards European Union.
In the debates to which these reports give rise, the European Council will
normally be represented by its President or one of its members.5"
The Committee of Three5 3 commented on the European Council in
its report of October 1979 as follows:
[t]he European Council was created to meet the demands of a period in
which the detailed guidance in the Treaties was running out, external circumstances had grown hostile, and the capacity to tackle these problems of
the Council of Ministers and of the Commission had declined. .

.

. It was

logical that the leaders of the Nine Governments, who could take the overall view and speak for all their colleagues to a greater extent than any individual Minister, should decide to create a forum in which they themselves
could deliberate on Community affairs .

. .

. Since that time [1974] the

European Council has met regularly thrice a year, and it can look back on
significant achievements. Within the Community framework it has resolved a series of contentious issues posing grave threats to solidarity and
progress. It has launched valuable new ventures. It has taken a stand on
major world issues. Without the European Council these results would
have obtained far more slowly and painfully or not at all. Its right to exist
is, then, no longer challenged.54
The development of the European Council brings with it a double
risk, however. On one hand there is the possible erosion of the Treaty if
the European Council concerns itself with treaty matters without bothering about the rules and procedures of the Treaty; on the other hand the
55
decision-making process in the Council will become even more difficult.
therefore, I have my doubts about the conclusion of the Committee of
Three that the European Council succeeded in escaping from the
"lourdeur" afflicting the traditional Community bodies and that it restored political impetus and spontaneity to the handling of Community
affairs at the highest level.5 6 In contrast, the Spinelli Report concluded
that the attempts to overcome the paralysis of the Council by setting up
the European Council had failed. 7
C. The Real Output
As previously discussed, there are conflicting statements on the decision-making in the Community.58 The Committee of Three felt, for ex52 Solemn Declaraton of European Union, 16 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 24-26 (1983).
53 See supra note 6.
54 COMMITrEE OF THREE REPORT, supra note 6, at 15-16.
55 See Van Rijn, supra note 22, at 13.
56 COMMITTEE OF THREE REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.

57 1982-1983 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-305/83/B) 4 (1982).
58 See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
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ample, that the Community was trying to do too much.5 9 Mathijesen has
recently expressed the view that this decision-making practically had
come to a halt.60 But how true is it that a rather modest output is produced or does the problem lie elsewhere? The following tables clearly
indicate that the output in itself is undoubtedly impressive. The production of regulations and decisions by the Council and the Commission in
the period 1967-1977 (figure and table 1) as well as the more recent output of the Commission (figure and table 2) is voluminous. Tables 3 to 5
indisputably show that a lot of work is done in Brussels and Strasbourg
and that it is highly productive.
Table 1
Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

Number of
Regulations
338
415
480
523
565
542
814
757

Number of
Decisions
205
197
186
236
184
243
322
293

Number of
Directives
13
24
29
25
28
37
38
54

1975
1976
1977

900
964
974

306
365
409

58
71
57

59 COMMITTEE OF THREE REPORT,

supra note 6, at 46.

60 p. MATHIJESEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

cited as

MATHIJESEN].

42 (3d. ed. 1980) [hereinafter
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Figure 1
Regulations, Directives andDecisions Made by Counciland
CoMmiSSion uder Article 189 EEC 1967-197761

Regulations

/

/
//
,..-

-j j

Decisions

"

---

Directives

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

61 This data has been compiled from the official journals of the European Community from
1967-1977 by my assistant at the time, Mr. Jos Houben. The concrete information about the production of the institutions after 1979 is taken from the general reports on the activities of the European Community. The figures refer exclusively to regulations, directives and decisions as discussed
in Article 189 of the EEC Treaty.
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Table 2
Year
1978
1979

Number of
Instruments
4799
4651

Number of
Proposals
647
616

Number of
Communications
178
216

1980

5901

542

208

1981
1982

6044
5321

651
675

181
202

Fiure 2
Commission'r Output 1978198262

--

-

Instruments

II

----------------

Proposals

200

Communications

1978

1980

62 From 1979 (the 13th General Report on the Activities of the EC) a summary is given of the
activities of the institutions in figures. With regard to the Commission, the figures oncern commission instruments (regulations, decisions, directives, recommendations, opinions), proposals (for regulations, decisions, directives, recommendations, assents) transmitted to the Council, and
communications, memorandums and reports. See 13 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 334 (1979); 14 GEN.
REP. EUR. CoMM. 28 (1981); 15 GEN. REP. EUR. CoMM. 30 (1981); 16 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 39
(1982).
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Table 3
Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

Number of
Reulations
474
414
400
312
414
393

1

Number of
Directives
48
50
49
51
45
42

Number of
Decisions
125
150
112
136
150
128

Riture 3

-

Council's Output 1977-19826

K
'K

'K
Regulations

/

1~

V

-------------------- Decisions

r
50

1977

Directives

1978

1979

1980

63 The reviews of the Councils work contain no specific figures for the Council's output; the
general reports of the commission document this information only from 1980. For the figures in
1980, 1981 and 1982 see 14 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 29 (1980); 15 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 28
(1981); 16 GEN. REP. EUR. CoMM. 27 (1982). The figures for 1977, 1978 and 1979 are taken from
the index of the O.J. EUR. COMM., section L (legislation).
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Table 4
Number of Days Spent on Council Meetings andMeetings of
64

PreparatoryBodies

Year

Ministers

Ambassadors
and Ministerial
Delegations

Committees and
Working Parties

EEC/EAEC/ECSC

EEC/EAEC/ECSC

EEC/EAEC/ECSC

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

21
21
44
46
80
63

39
71
97
108
128
146

302
325
505
655
783
744

1964

102

229

1002

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

35
70
75
61
69
81
75
73
79
66
67
65
71
76
59

105
112
134132
129
154
127
159
148
114
118
108
122
104
107

760
952
1233
1253
1412
1403
1439
2135
1820
1999
2079
2130
2108
2090
2000

1980

83

106

2078

Table 5

Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

Number of
Resolutions
256
239
250
337
220
390

Number of
Working
Documents
452
539
643
952
1063
1172

64 28 REVIEW OF THE COUNCIL'S WORK 277 (1980).

Number of
Written
Questions
1209
1330
1501
2323
1993
2344

Number of
Oral
Questions
84
125
197
85
953
992
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FigureS
65
Output of the European Parliament1977-1982
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65 The figures concern resolutions working documents (requests for opinions reports and motions for resolution), written and oral questions. See 11 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 321 (1977); 12
GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 356 (1978); 13 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 332 (1979); 14 GEN. REP. EUR.
CoMM. 28 (1980); 15 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 28 (1981); 16 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 26 (1982).
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While it is true that the above data is quantitative, it is nonetheless
important if only to prove the untenability of the statements about the
demise of decision-making in the Community. For the same reason, the
chairman of the Committee on institutional problems of the European
Parliament is not mistaken in stating that: "[i]t's a relief, if a decision,
even the smallest one, pops up from the Council." 66 In 1982 alone, the
Council made decisions on 393 regulations, 42 directives and 195 decisions.6 7 These figures aside, such statements also disregard the indisputable successes of the Communities. The Spierenburg Report 68 pointed out
that since the founding of the Communities decisions from the Council
and the Commission have led to the customs union, the common agricultural policy, free movements of persons and the common commercial
policy. The Communities play an important part in the GATT negotiations and make an essential contribution to the new type of relationship
which has been evolved with developing countries.6 9
Admittedly, proof that the quantitative output is important does not
yet say anything about its quality. The activities of the EP appear to be
extensive in quantitative output, but it is not possible to draw any conclusions about the real importance and influence of this parliament. As the
Committee of Three stated, "[t]here are three or four times as many
Council meetings now as there were in 1958 and the lower levels of the
Council machinery have ramified even faster. Yet the significance of the
business concluded had not increased in proportion to the volume."7 0 In
other words, the conclusion must be that in the decision-making process
of the Communities, the problem is not quantitative, but rather
qualitative.
D.

The Reasons for the Quality Deficit

This section will examine some examples ofgeneral strains on Community decision-making which contribute to this quality deficit. Here I
shall focus on the influence of the national decision-making procedure,
the discrepancy between the long-term goals of the Community and the
Treaty instruments, and finally, the fragmentation of the Community
policy. I shall then discuss institutionalstrains on the decision-making
66 Parlements leden Weinig Geschokt Door "Mandaats"-Crisis,1982 EUROPA VAN MORGEN
(No. 4) 55 (Feb. 3, 1982).
67 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68 SPIERENBURG COMMISSION, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS SERVICES 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SPIERENBURG REPORT].
69 See also H. IPSEN, EUROPAISCHE GEMEINSCHATrSRECHT 155-56 (1972); COMMITTEE OF
THREE REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-5.
70 COMMITTEE OF THREE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8.
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machinery in the Community including the insufficient delegation to the
Commission and the unanimity practice as a result of the Luxemburg
Compromise.
1.

GeneralStrains

a. The Influence of the National Decision-Making Procedure
The way in which a national administration adopts the position it
wants to defend in the negotiations in Brussels carries important consequences for the decision-making process within the Community.7" When
the national viewpoint is determined after a strong interdepartmental coordination procedure, it becomes politically difficult to deviate from it in
Brussels. And when such a national point of view has survived for a long
time in the Commission's working groups and, later, in those of the
Council, it becomes virtually impossible for the member of the Council in
question to give up this point without demanding in return some kind of
quid pro quo from the other Member States. The package deals which
result from this give and take constitute a strain on the speed and efficiency of the decision-making by the Council. The same applies if national parliaments try to bind their government by instructions given in
advance. Such scrutinous procedures make the search for agreement
within the Council more difficult and more laborious.7 2

On the other hand, if there is no unanimity at the national level
about the margins of negotiation in Brussels, for example, because of the
weak internal position of the national government in question, this can
also have a disastrous effect on the decision-making process in the Council. Members of the Council will tend to avoid decisions with the result
that few, if any, decisions will be made.
71 C. SASSE, REGIERUNGEN PARLAMENTE MINISTERRAT, 116-27 (1975) [hereinafter cited as C.
SASSE].
72 Vedel Report, supra note 14, at 33. The most important scrutiny procedure is employed by
the Danish parliament. The Danish government is obliged to negotiate in Brussels on the basis of
the viewpoint of the parliamentary "Committee for the Common Market." The influence of this
Committee is nicely illustrated by the recent development of the common fisheries policy. Initially,
while Denmark was in the chair of the Council, the Committee blocked a final settlement of this
common policy. EUROPE (No. 3518), Jan. 5, 1983, at 1. But, later, it agreed, while Germany was in
the chair of the Council, with the compromise proposed by the President of the Council, the President of the Commission and the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs. EUROPE (No. 3531), Jan. 22,
1983, at 7. A global outline of these kinds of procedures can be found in the Krieg Report (Assemble Nationale Frangaise, second ordinary session 1978-1979, at 11-12). A more detailed survey of
parliamentary scrutiny procedures in the EC can be found in S. SASSE, supra note 71, at 78-115 and
in J. FITZMAURICE, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 27-50 (1978). The German and British procedures, in particular, are treated in C. SCHWEITZER, DIE NATIONALE PARLAMENTE IN DER
GEMEINSCHAFT-IHRE
EUROPAGESETZGEBUNG,

SCHWINDENDER

27-91 (1978).

EINFLUSS

IN

BONN

AND

WESTMINISTER

AUF DIE

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

b.

5:902(1983)

Discrepancy Between the Long-term Goals of the Community and
the Treaty Instruments

The differences in the Treaty between negative and positive integraexpose another general strain in the decision-making process. This
is due to the fact that the Treaty contains few or no specific instruments
for carrying out an economic, monetary and industrial policy to complement or replace the national policies in these areas. 74 An examination of
article 2 of the Treaty will reveal that its two fundamental objectives are
the establishment of a common market and the progressive approximation of the economic policies of the member states. While the first objective has been realized the second one is still in the distant future. This
is due in large measure to the fact that the Treaty contains little competence and few instruments to enable the Community institutions to realize a common socio-economic policy. 76 Add to this the fact that the
Treaty itself does not contain any means or instruments to tackle new
problems that were not topical subjects in 1958, for example, the energy
crisis, the environmental problem or unemployment. Article 235 of the
Treaty offers only a relative solution to this problem.77 At the moment,
there is almost general agreement that the Community does not have the
tion 73

competence required in order to act determinedly in the field of monetary
and economic policy, in particular with regard to the industrial, social
73 Negative integration is defined as the elimination of obstacles and the abolition of discriminations between the Member States necessary for the establishment of a common market. Positive
integration is defined as the realization of common policies, viz., in the economic and monetary
areas. Cf P. MATHIJESEN, supra note 60, at 123.
74 Speech by S. Patijn, Het Europese Parlement en de Besluitvorming in de Europese Gemeenschappen 7, Colloquium, University of Leiden (Jan. 26, 1979).
75 Article 2 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively
approximating the economic policies of the Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between the States belonging to it.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2.
76 While article 103 of the EEC Treaty (conjunctural policy) speaks of "measures appropriate to
the "situation," article 105 (economic policies) makes possible only "recommendations on how to
achieve such cooperation" of their economic policies; article 108 (balance of payments) also contains
only "recommend[ations] to the Council concerning the granting of mutual assistance." Article 118
(social field) limits itself to the "task of promoting close cooperation between Member States in the
social field ...
" Id. arts. 103, 105, 108, 118.
77 Article 235 of the EEC Treaty provides that:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation
of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers. The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
EEC Treaty, id. at 235.
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and regional policies.7 8 Thus a discrepancy arises between the officially
proclaimed long-term aims of the Community and the new demands of
the 1980's on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the instruments,
which as provided by the Treaty, are at the Community's disposal, to
realize these aims. It is this discrepancy which, in my opinion increasingly frustrated the Community's decision-making machinery. The
Community's institutions are blamed for not being able to realize what in
the abstract is considered by the Member States to be necessary goals.
But in actuality the problem is the failure of the political will to place the
necessary tools and means at the disposal of the Community institutions.
c.

Fragmentation

The distribution of the Commission's administrative sectors and the
portfolios of the members of the Commission is another example of the
way the Community decision-making process is affected.7 9 Most important in this respect is the fact that the Community policy is developed
only in a fragmentary way and is not part of an "overall strategy." This
results in competitive relations within the Community (between the
members of the Commission as well as between the different Councils)
and within departments in the member states. Actually, this latter fact is
not all that surprising, for the member states also do not always have a
coherent "strategy" to coordinate their policies.
This "compartmentalized policy-making" 80 functioned fairly adequately in the transitional period of the EEC, when the Community's
activities were based on powers which are fairly accurately defined in the
Treaty. But the policymaking strategy created severe coordination
problems when the attention of the Community had to be focused on
policy areas for which the EEC Treaty not only provided less competence but about which there were no unanimous views in the member
states either. This problem of lack of coherence and coordination of the
Community's activities is indeed acknowledged, but no adequate remedy
has yet been found.81
2.

InstitutionalStrains

Second, there are institutional strains in the decision-making ma78 Wallace, Walking Backwards in Unity, in W. WALLACE, W. WALLACE & C. WEBB, POLICYMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 310 (1978) [hereinafter cited as W. WALLACE]; C.

SASSE,supra note 71, at 198.
79 Id.
80 Id.

81 See, e.g., 8 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 297 (1974); 9 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 19 (1975); 10
GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 33 (1976).
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chinery in the European Communities. One of these is the fact that the
Council tries to do too much.8 2 Article 155 of the Treaty provides for a
delegation of powers from the Council to the Commission8 3 but, until
now, such a delegation takes place only in a very minor way, and mainly
in the agricultural area.84 Given the large number of decisions that have
to be taken in the implementation of the Treaty, this non-delegation
stands in the way of an appropriate and quick decision-making by the
Council."
However, the most important institutional strain lies in the following aspects of the decision-making procedure itself: the question of majority decisions, the Luxemburg Compromise and the importance of
"vital interests."
The failure to apply the majority rules laid down in the Treaty following the Luxemburg Compromise is generally regarded as one of the
most important causes of the qualitative paralysis of the Council. 86 The
Luxemburg Compromise of 1966 has been able to exert such a pernicious
influence because unanimity has become general practice. This unanimity practice has in particular two negative consequences. First, the practice has distorted the Treaty's institutional decision-making procedures
with the result that a de facto veto stands in the way of quick and qualitatively good decisions.87 Second, it has disturbed the balance of power
between the Council and the Commission as established in the EEC
Treaty, in particular cooperation as equals which enables the Commission to play an independant role as an arbiter.8 8 This disturbance has led
to a weakened Commission that is somewhat dependent on the Council,
and in an overloaded Council which becomes the only focus of the Community activities.89
3. Remedies
In the first place, the institutional balance between the Commission
and the Council should be restored. This means a return to majority
voting which would require a revitalization of article 149 of the Treaty.
82 See supra note 6.
83 Article 155 of the EEC Treaty provides that: "[i]n order to ensure the proper functioning and
development of the common market, the Commission shall. . . exercise the powers conferred on it
by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid down by the latter." EEC Treaty, supra note
3, art. 155.
84 See Van Rijn, supra note 22, at 27.
85
86
87
88
89

Id.
Id. at 25.
COMMITTEE OF THREE REPORT, supra note 6, at 50-51.
Cf P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT I, supra note 25, at 147.
COMMITTEE OF THREE REPORT, supra note 6, at 50-5 1.
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Second, the concept of "vital interest" should be revised. As the Committee of Three stated, "[i]n the reality of the Community today, voting
cannot be used to override individual states on matters which they regard
as involving very important interests." 90 I have my doubts about this
observation, given that the concept of "vital interest" is derived from
international law. 91 For example, article 27 of the Convention of Vienna, 92 provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.93 Moreover, article
46 of the Vienna Convention adds to this that a violation is manifest if it
would be objectively evident to any state conducting itself in the matter
in accordance with normal practice and in good faith. 94 In other words,
the Vienna Convention objectified the concept of "vital interest."
Whereas consistent with the practice of the Community the concept of
"vital interest" is interpreted subjectively with each member state itself
defining what are "vital interests."9 5 This is definitely the root of the
problem.
These remarks are not meant to suggest that "vital interests" are not
important for the member states. On the contrary, I too hold the view
that it would be irresponsible and unjustifiable if one member state of the
EEC forced another member state into a minority position when a really
vital subject of the latter was at stake. The "abuse" of the Luxemburg
Compromise has been twofold; the practice of unanimity was applied to
less important matters with the result that unanimity became the rule
and the Council no longer concerned itself with the question whether or
not a "vital interest" was at stake in making certain decisions. 96 The
result being that a kind of automatic veto weapon came into being.
Therefore, I do not agree with the Committee of Three that "each State
90 Id. at 50.
91 C. SASSE, supra note 71, at 140.
92 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1972 NEDERLANDS TRACTENBLAD No. 51 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention Treaty].
93 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention Treaty provides that; "[a] party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without
prejudice to Article 46." Id. art. 27.
94 Article 46 of the Vienna Convention Treaty provides that:
1. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed
in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of
fundamental importance. 2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any
State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.
Id. art. 46.
95 COMMrITEE OF THREE REPORT, supra note 6, at 50.
96 See A Community of Twelve? The Impact of FurtherEnlargementof the European Communities, 1978 BRUGES 92.
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must remain the judge of where its very important interests lie." 97 When
several states have committed themselves to concerted action as is the
case in the Community, then it is not acceptable that one single member
state, by invoking unilaterally its "vital interest," should be allowed to
frustrate the general interest of the Community in its entirety. 9s The
conclusions of the Summit of Stuttgart 99 again accentuate the necessity
to do something about the problem of vital interests. As the recent report of five national institutes of international affairs concluded that:
[I]t is impossible for the Community to operate within a framework in
which national governments have frequently recourse to a veto to block
decisions favoured by the majority. Where existing common policies require to be managed, majority voting in the Council of Ministers must be
accepted if the Community's policy-making is not to grand to a halt.1°°
The first step should be to objectify the criteria for defining "vital
interests" as was done the Convention of Vienna. Then, arrangements
and procedures ought to be agreed upon for the application of these criteria, for instance, by clearly marking off and defining the subjects and
areas in which such "a vital interest" is not at stake. The Commission
should play an important part in these procedures.' 0 1 If one does not
want to get bogged down in a purely intergovernmental cooperation in
which every member state has by definition the right of veto, then the
delineation of "vital interests" is indeed the least one can do in the circumstances. But even if majority voting is restored and "vital interests"
defined and restricted, two serious problems remain: (1) the overloading
of the Council, and (2) the discrepancy between the long-term goals of
the Community and the Treaty instruments.
The first problem is the least difficult. On condition that the practice of invoking "vital interests" will be canalized, the Council would
limit itself to decisions with a general character ("framework laws") and
take such decisions by a qualified majority. All executing decisions
10 2
should then be delegated to the Commission.
97 CoMMiTTE OF THREE REPORT, supra

note 6, at 51.
98 Cf EUROPE (No. 3518) Jan. 5, 1983, at 1; EUROPE (No. 3519) Jan. 6, 1983, at 1.
99 16 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 24 (1983).
100 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PROGRESS
OR DECLINE? 45 (1983).

101 In the recent proposals of the European Parliament with regard to an European constitution,
the Commission is assigned with the appreciation of vital interests. See EUROPE (No. 3689) Sept. 16,
1983, at 1.
102 Van Rijn, supra note 22, at 28 proposes a different scheme, i.e., unanimity for framework
laws, a qualified majority for all decisions with a general character executing these framework laws
and, finally, all other executing decisions to take by the Commission. In my opinion, however, there
is no reason for the Council to decide with unamity provided that the concept of vital interest will be
revised as indicated.
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The second problem, that of the discrepancy, is more complicated.
Here the question is how the member states are to arrive at decisions in
policy areas which so far have remained national but which are indispensable to and of crucial importance in furthering European integration.
As early as ten years ago, Professor Verloren Van Themaat pointed out
the important aspect of the division of powers between Community and
member states in stating that: "[t]he main question here is in what fields
the member states remain solely or primarily competent . . .,in what
fields, on account of their interconnection, the Community powers must
have priority . . . , and in what fields the member states may remain
active side by side with the Community.1"3
Writing in this same vein, Helen Wallace has distinguished four categories of policy sectors: (1) sectors in which the Communities have already become the primary source of policy and responsibilities have been
clearly transferred away from national governments. As a consequence,
the main responsibility which falls on national administrations is to ensure that their operation of national policies conforms to Community
rules for example, the customs union and the common agricultural policy; (2) sectors in which responsibilities are divided, such that member
states retain a national policy but have also accepted a specific Community policy in parallel. For example, member States maintain their own
policies towards developing countries and at the same time participate in
a Community program of development aid; (3) sectors in which the main
responsibility remains with the member states. Community activities in
these kinds of areas are considered as a marginal though useful contribution to the national resources. Examples include social and regional policy; and (4) sectors which remain clearly domestic because they are not
in the main stream of economic management and for which the intervention of the Communities is, consequently, problematic. An example of
this is education.' 0 4 These sectors may be characterized as supranational
sectors (1), national sectors (4) and intergovernmental sectors (2 and 3).
I would add to this that in the sectors in which the main responsibility
remains with the member states but for which the Treaty also provides
Community tasks (the intergovernmental sectors), the responsibilities of
the Communities remain vague. An example of this is the coordination
of the economic policies of the member states or the realization of a common social policy.
Recent research has shown that in the functioning and working of
103 P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT I, supra note 25, at 412-13.
104 Wallace, NationalBulls in the Community China Shop: The Role of National Governments in
Community Policy-Making, in W. WALLACE, supra note 78, at 39, 40.
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international organizations, majority decisions will not, as a rule, impose
obligations.I°5 If they do, however, as is the case of the EEC, then a vote
will often be avoided, especially when important issues are at stake.
Moreover, it turns out that the unanimity requirement will often form a
serious impediment to a decisive and alert policy."0 6 In addition, practice
shows also that agreement through the majority rule is only conceivable
if the objectives to be attained have been defined0 7 precisely and if the
Community powers have been clearly delineated.1
On the other hand, if the interests at issue cannot as yet be weighed
precisely; if the objectives to be pursued are still so indeterminate and
vague that it is rather difficult to determine which role, and to what extent, certain factors will play in the process, and if optimal procedures
and instruments have not yet been developed, then unanimity seems to be
unattainable.10 8 An impasse in the decision-making will be the consequence. The above remarks suggest that a wider application of the majority rule within the Community only stands a chance in matters in the
first category (accurately defined objectives, clearly defined Communitarian powers) and stands little or no chance in matters in the second category (vaguely defined objectives and no optimal procedures and
instruments). Since the problems the EEC now faces involve activities of
the intergovernmental sectors, they belong to this second category. Consequently, the application of the majority rule to these problems does not
seem likely until they have been clearly defined in concrete terms, for
instance, after an adaptation of the Treaty. Therefore, a new Messina 109
will be necessary in order to draw up a general program with time schedules and procedures with regard to these, as yet, intergovernmental policy areas. In other words, a new treaty between the member states will
be required.
105 P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, RECTSGRONDS LAGEN VAN EEN NIEW INTERNATIONALE
ECONOMISCHE ORDE 36, 55 (1979) [hereinafter cited as VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT III].
106 Id.
107 Id. at 57-58.
108 Id.

109 At a meeting in Messina, Italy, at the beginning of June, 1955, the foreign ministers of the six
announced that they intended to continue the attempt to establish a United Europe so as to preserve
Europe's role in the world, restore its influence and prestige and steadily increase the standard of
living of the people. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, STEPS
TO EUROPEAN UNITY, COMMUNITY PROGRESS TO DATE: A CHRONOLOGY 16 (1981).
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III.

ATTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT?
A.

Powers of the European Parliament According to the EEC Treaty
1.

Participationin the Legislative Procedure

Generally speaking, the EEC Treaty provides only for consultation
on important matters such as agriculture, transport and competition,"' 0
but the Council does, in fact, consult Parliament in many cases when not
specifically required by the Treaty. When provided for in the Treaty,
consultation constitutes an "essential procedural requirement," and failure to comply with it constitutes a ground for annulment of an act by the
Court of Justice."1
2.

Participationin the Budgetary Procedure

Originally, the EEC Treaty provided that the EEC budget be financed by contributions of the member states.1 12 The European Parliament could only propose modifications in the draft budget drawn up by
the Council.' 1 3 It was the understanding that the contributions of member states would be later replaced by Community resources.' 14 This understanding was realized in 1970.115 As a consequence, the powers of the
European Parliament were increased in 1970 and 1975.116 Article 203 of
the EEC Treaty was amended and the EP was given two new powers. It
could now accept and reject the draft budget and ask for a new draft
budget, 117 and it had final power regarding non-obligatory expenditures. 118 However, with regard to obligatory expenditures, those that result necessarily from the Treaty or from acts adopted by its
institutions," 9 the Council remains the principal decision-making
I10 See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 43, para. 2 (agriculture), 75, para. 1 (transport), and 87,
para. 1 (competition).
111 See supra note 31.
112 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 200.
113 Id. art. 203, (prior to 1970 amendment).
114 Id. art. 201.
115 Decisions on the Replacement of FinancialContributionsfrom Member States, 13 J.O. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 94) 19 (1970).
116 The Treaty amending certain budgetary provisions of the Treaties establishing the European
Communities and the Merger Treaty of April 22, 1970, 14 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 2) 1 (1971)
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1971). The Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and the Merger Treaty of July 22, 1975, 20 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 359) 1 (1977) (entered into force June 1, 1977).
117 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 203.
118 Id. art. 203, paras. 4, 5.
119 Id. art. 203, para. 4.
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body. 120

The question of which expenditures are obligatory or non-obligatory, however, is differently interpreted by the Parliament and the Council. 12 1 The continuing differences of opinion between the three
institutions on this problem resulted in serious difficulties for the budgetary procedures after 1979.122 On June 30, 1982, a joint declaration was
signed by the Presidents of the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament, respectively, which contained a new classification of expenditure.123 But, at the end of 1982, new difficulties arose on the
classification of the expenditures covering the financial impact of the
compensation to the United Kingdom for that year. 124 The Council had
classified these as obligatory, in consideration of which the EP recognized the non-obligatory character of these expenditures. 125 The powers
of the EP in the budgetary procedure have certainly increased. However,
as the Vedel Report stated: "there should be no illusions about the Parliament's budgetary power . .

.

. In the Community, as in the States,

the budget in the main does nothing more than put figures to decisions
taken 'upstream.' ,126
3.

ParliamentaryQuestions

The EEC Treaty only provides for the possibility of questioning the
Commission.' 2 7 But the EP extended this obligation to, and was accepted by, the Council in 1958.128 In 1962, the EP introduced the procedure of oral questions followed by a debate which was again accepted by
the Council and by the Commission. Finally, in 1973, the question time
in which Council and Commission agreed to participate was
29
introduced.1
120

Id. art. 203, para. 5. The obligatory expenditures represent about 75% of the Community

budget.
121 The Treaty contains only a vague definition of obligatory expenditures. See supra note 27.
122 See 12 GEN. REPORT EUR. CoMM. 48 (1978); 13 GEN. REPORT EUR. COMM. 46 (1979); 14
GEN. REPORT EUR. COMM. 50-53 (1980); 15 GEN. REPORT EUR. COMM. 49 (1981).
123 See Joint Declaration By the Three Constitutions, 15 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 7 (1982).
The three institutions defined compulsory expenditure as "such expenditure as the budgetary authority is obliged to enter in the budget to enable the community to meet its obligations, both internally
and externally, render the treaties and acts adopted in accordance therewith." Id. at 7-8.
124 15 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 10) 54 (1981).

125
126
140.
127
128

26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 13) 67 (1983). See also EUROPE (No. 3539), Feb. 3, 1983, at 1.
Vedel Report,supra note 14, at 30; see also P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT I,supra note 25, at

EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 140, para. 3.
P. MATHIJESEN, supra note 60, at 25-26.
129 Id. at 25-26.
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4.

Conciliation Procedure in the EP

During the negotiations for the Treaty amending certain financial
provisions in 1975, a Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission was adopted instituting a conciliation procedure in the event of the Council departing from the opinion of the
EP. 3 The above-mentioned joint declaration of June 30, 1982, on various measures to improve the budgetary procedure1 3 1 contains an improvement of this conciliation procedure between the three
institutions. 32 In addition, procedures have been developed, in practice,
through the competent parliamentary committees which have increased
the Commission's parliamentary responsibility and the consultation of
the EP by the Council. 133 In practice these procedures depart markedly
from what was originally intended. This, in part, is a result of the lack of
flexibility of the Council: package agreements in the Council are usually
concluded even before discussion starts with the various parliamentary
delegations.13 Altogether, these developments remain marginal and the
direct elections of 1979 have not as yet added any substantial improve1 35
ments to the EP's position.
5. Motion of Censure
The power to dismiss the Commission as a body by the adoption of
a motion of censure 136 appears to be a rather impressive power, but, in
fact, it is not. Such a motion is not addressed to the real decision-maker
in the Community which is the Council. As a result, the Council which
bears the ultimate responsibility 137
for the activities of the Community is
EP.
the
of
reach
the
left outside
1 38
6. Article 175 of the EEC Treaty

At the end of 1982, for the first time in the history of the Communities, the European Parliament decided to bring proceedings against the
Council before the Court of Justice for failure to act on the common
130 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 89) 1 (1975); see also P. MATHUESEN, supra note 60, at 24.

131 See supra note 124.
132 14 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. C 89) 1 (1975); see also P. MATHUESEN, supra note 60, at 24.
133 See supra note 124.
134 14 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 12) 10 (1981); see also 16 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 53 (1982).
135 P. VERLOREN VAN THERMAAT II, supra note 40, at 97-98.

136 See P. MATHUESEN, supra note 60, at 33; P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT II, supra note 40, at
181.
137 See P. MATHUESEN, supra note 60, at 33.
138 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 144.
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transport policy.1 39 Two months before, and in conformity with article
175 of the Treaty,'" Parliament had instructed its President to call upon
the Council to act, accusing it of failing to do so in the field of common
transport policy.41 The problem with this supervisory power is, however, that the only avenue open to the Court of Justice is to declare that
the failure to act is contrary to the Treaty, so that the Court action re14 2
mains virtually without direct consequences.
In conclusion, it is evident that the EP has few real powers. To a
large degree the functions are, indeed, advisory and relate to the communication of ideas, the gathering of information and the formation and
expression of public opinion on Community matters.143 The budgetary
powers have certainly increased, but within the institutional system of
the Treaty there is no place for a European Parliament that can determine in a decisive way the substance of the Community budget.'"
Moreover, the budget of the Community fulfills quite a different function
from the budgets of states in earlier ages.' 45 And as the result of the
recent application of article 175 of the Treaty will undoubtedly illustrate,
such an action will produce little effect as long as the member states are
lacking the political will to pursue a well defined policy. The direct elec46
tions have as yet contributed little to change this situation.
B.

Proposals for Improvement
1.

The 1972 Vedel Report

The proposals contained in the Vedel Report are formulated against
the background of an economic and monetary union, 47 and concern
48
mainly the enlargement of the powers of the European Parliament.
139 Cf P. MATHIJESEN,

supra note 60, at 27.

140 Article 175 of the EEC Treaty provides that; "[s]hould the Council or the Commission, in

infringement of this Treaty, fail to act, the Member States and the other institutions or the Community may bring an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement established." EEC
Treaty, supra note 3, art. 175, para. I.
141 16 GEN. REPORT EUR. COMM. 24 (1982).
142 Article 175 paragraph 2 of the EEC Treaty provides that; "'[t]heaction [against the Council or
the Commission] shall be admissible only if the institution concerned has first been called upon to
act. If, within two months of being so called upon, the institution concerned has not defined its
position, the action may be brought within a further period of two months. EEC Treaty, supra note
3, art. 175, para. 2.
143 Transport: ProceedingsAgainst the Councilfor Failureto Act, 15 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 9)
57 (1982).
144 P. MATHIJESEN, supra note 60, at 32.
145

T.

HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

II, supra note 40, at 156.
I, supra note 25, at 140.

146 Cf P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT
147 P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT
148

See supra note 135.

18 (1981).
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the position of the Commission and the
But the Report also discusses
49
Council in the Community.'
One of the proposals recommends a gradual increase in legislative
powers. As a first step, Parliament would be given: (1) a parallel decision-making power in matters which materially involve either the Community's constitutive power or its relations with other persons in
international law,15 ° and (2) the power to veto measures directed at harmonizing legislation which has important effects on national laws, or
questions of principle affecting common policies which may also involve
harmonization measures.15 ' This veto power would, in a second step, be
transformed into a genuine power of shared decision-making such that a
Council decision, for example, would not come into force without being
approved by the Parliament.1 52 With regard to the budgetary power of
the EP the report emphasizes that the gap between the budgetary power
proper and the power to make decisions with financial implications will
disappear as soon as this concept of shared decision-making is extended
153
to the EP.
Secondly, the Report underscores the need for an increase in EP
power. In addition to the utilization of parliamentary procedures and an
improvement in relations with the Council, the Report accentuates the
parliamentary investiture of the President of the Commission.154 With
respect to the relations between the EP and the national parliaments after
direct elections, the Report stresses the necessity of constructing some
sort of communications network that engenders consensus. 155 Regarding
the Council, the Report6 stresses that the majority principle of voting
15
should be reactivated.
2. Reportsfrom Community Institutions
At the Paris meeting of December 1974, the heads of government
asked the Community institutions to present a report on the plan for the
European Union. They agreed also to instruct Mr. Tindemans, at the
time Belgium's Prime Minister, to prepare a summary report on the basis
Vedel Report, supra note 14, at 34.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 39. List A includes: revision of the EEC Treaty (Articles 201 and 236), implementation of Article 235, admission of new members and ratification of international agreements by the
Community.
153 Id. at 39-41.
154 Id. at 47-48.
155 Id. at 55.
156 Id. at 58.
149
150
151
152
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of the reports presented by the institutions and his consultations with the
governments and representative sectors of public opinion in the Community.15 7 The following is a brief summary of the reports from the Community institutions.
a.

Commission Report

In its report on the institutional structure of the European Union,
the Commission examined the question of executive power and recommended that the most suitable model, once the European Union was
fully under way, would be a collegial body, whose members would be
independent of the national government. This organ would absorb all
the executive functions of the Council as well as the executive and administrative functions together with the power of initiative of the present
Commission.' 5 8 With regard to the legislative branch, the Commission
recommended that a bicameral system consisting of a Chamber of Peoples and a Chamber of States; the latter designated by the national
governments. 159
b.

European Parliament Report

The report from the EP voiced strong support for a European Union
based on an institutional structure which contains the following three
organs. First, a body, within which participation by the member states in
the decision-making process of the Union will be guaranteed; second, a
Parliament having budgetary powers and powers of control participating
on at least an equal footing in the legislative process; finally, a single
decision-making center which will be in the nature of a real European
government, independent of the national Governments and responsible
to the Parliament of the Union. 6 '
c.

Court of Justice Report

In its report the Court of Justice anticipated the problem of a possible clash between legislative enactments and the Treaty provisions. If
and when this occurred, the Court of Justice saw itself as the appropriate
body to exercise judicial review. 6 '
157 Id. at 71.
158 Id. at 77.
159 Reports on European Union, 8 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 9) 5 (Supp. 1975).
160 8 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 9) 11 (Supp. 1975).
161 Id.
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d.

Economic and Social Committee Report

The Economic and Social Committee in its report called for a European Parliament elected by universal suffrage whose legislative function
in all the matters coming within Community jurisdiction will have to be
progressively assigned. This Parliament would be responsible for adopting the budget, passing Community laws, and supervising the application
of such laws. It would also
be empowered to take action on its own
162
initiative in certain areas.
The Committee suggested looking at the executive function from
two perspectives. First, during the transition period before the achievement of a full-fledged European Union, the main decision-making powers
should be vested in the Council, while the implementing powers should
fall within the purview of the Commission. 163 During this interim stage
the Council of Ministers should include one or two permanent ministers
from each member state. These ministers should be members of their
respective governments with powers delegated to them. To lend their
deliberations in the Council the requisite effectiveness, they could be accompanied by specialist ministers according to the agenda."6 The Council of Ministers should be allowed to take part in the debates of the
Parliament, help in the drafting of Community legislation and together
with the Commission ensure that such legislation is implemented in the

member states. 165
The Commission, as the concrete expression of the Community,
must possess wide initiative and executive powers. For this reason, the
Economic and Social Committee considers that the Commission should
lay before the European Parliament a program setting out the objectives
it proposes to attain during its term of office and the means it intends to
use to attain them. In the final stage of European Union, the members of
the Commission should be appointed by the European Parliament using
the method just described. 166 The Commission, in consultation with the
Council of Ministers, would be responsible for drawing up draft Community legislation for submission to the Parliament, and for defending such
167
draft legislation before Parliament.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 18.

164id.at 29.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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The Tindemans Report

Tindemans proposed the following changes for the European institutions. With regard to the powers of the European Parliament, the
Tindemans Report stated that:
[T]he Council should immediately allow the EP to take initiatives by undertaking to consider the resolutions which Parliament addresses to it. This
would permit the Assembly to make an effective contribution towards defining common policies. In the course of the progressive development of
the European Union this practice should be given legal value through a
Treaty amendment, which would accord to the Parliament a real right of
initiative. Parliament should be able to consider all questions within the
competence of the Union, whether or not they are covered by the

Treaties. 168
With regard to the Council of Ministers, the Tindemans Report stated
that:
[t]he Council of Ministers (foreign affairs) should be entrusted by a decision
of the European Council with coordinating in the most appropriate manner
the activities of the specialist Councils, and the distinction between ministerial meetings devoted to political cooperation and meetings of the Council
should be abolished . . . . Recourse to majority voting
in the Council
69
should become normal practice in the Community. 1
With respect to the Commission and its role in the execution and
administration of common policies within the Community, Tindemans
recommended that greater use be made of article 155 of the Treaty,
which provides for such powers to be conferred on the Commission.' 7 °
The authority and cohesion of the Commission, he felt, should be increased by having the President of the Commission appointed by the European Council."'7 The President of the Commission would then appoint
his colleagues in consultation with the Council, bearing in mind the
number of Commissioners allocated to each country. 7 2
4. Fresco on Enlargement 1978
Against the background of the accession of Greece, Portugal and
Spain to the Communities, the Commission analyzed the institutional
consequences of this enlargement in the so-called "Fresco" of April 20,
1978. 17' The Commission emphasized that the functioning of the Com168 Id.
169 Id.

170 Tindemans, Report to the European Council on the European Union, 9 BULL. EUR. COMM.
(No. 1) 29 (Supp. 1976).
171 Id. at 30-3 1.
172 Id. at 31.
173 Id.
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munity institutions should be improved in order to combat the tendency
of decision-making procedures becoming more cumbersome due to the
enlargement of the Community's membership. The main changes would
be: (1) to make greater use of majority voting on matters which practical
experience has shown to be suitable for majority voting; (2) to have the
Commission, as a rule, exercise administrative and executive functions;
and (3) to take greater care in deciding which of the legal instruments
provided for by the Treaties is to be used in each case and how it is to be

implemented. 174
5.

The SpierenburgReport of 1979

Although the Spierenburg Report only concerns the internal organization of the Commission, it contains some suggestions which also bear
on the decision-making process as a whole. The following recommendations were made: (1) the number of portfolios assigned to the members
of the Commission should be limited to eight; 175 (2) the arguments for a
small Commission of twelve members (one from each member state)
must prevail over those for a larger Commission of, for example, seventeen members;1 76 and (3) the governments should not insist on the appointment to the Commission of the candidate of their first choice, if the
President-elect makes an objection. In that case they should nominate a
177
second candidate.
6. Report of the Committee of Three
The Committee of Three was entrusted by the European Council
with a mandate to consider adjustments to the machinery and procedures
of the Community institutions.178 Its hefty report contains suggestions
concerning the three main institutions. First, the committee recommended that the Council should strengthen the Presidency in its dual
role of organizational control and political impetus and ensure that the
Presidency has the authority to impose order and discipline in the work
of the Council and its subordinate bodies.179 Concomitantly, the Council's burden of decision-making should be reduced by delegating some of
its functions to the Commission and by delegating decisions of little or no
80
political significance to lower levels in the Council's own machinery.
174 Id.
175
176
177
178
179

It BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 2) 9, 11-12 (Supp. 1978).
For more details, see 11 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 2) 11-12 (Supp. 1978).
SPIERENBURG REPORT, supra note 68, at 32.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 47.

180 COMMITTEE OF THREE REPORT, supra note

6,

at 1.
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In all cases where the Treaty does not impose unanimity and very important interests are not involved for any state, voting should be the normal
practice after an appropriate but limited effort for consensus has been
made, and a state which wants to avert a vote because of very important
interest should say so clearly and explicitly. 81 Second, it was recommended that the Commission continue to present its overall working program to the Parliament for debate at regular intervals and every six
months representatives of the Commission should hold talks with the
managers of parliamentary business to plan on a consultative program
for the coming period.182 In addition, all Commissioners should be prepared to appear in person before the EP. 18 3 Finally, with regard to the
European Parliament, the report stressed the need to better relations between members of the EP and their respective national parliaments.' 8 4 It
recommended appointing junior ministers to take over the main tasks of
liaison between the Council, and the EP 18 5 The report also looked into
the Commission-Parliament-Council triangle noting that it was incomplete without direct contact between the EP and the European Council.' 8 6 A bi-annual report to it by the President of the European Council
87
in person was seen as a possible solution.1
7. Report on the Mandate of May 30, 1980
The mandate given to the Commission by the Council on May 30,
1980 concerned the common agricultural policy, structural changes and
the budgetary problem, in particular regarding the British contribution. 8 8 With regard to the institutional aspect, the Commission in its
report of June 1981 expressed the firm view that a return to the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties would help to re-establish the
189
unity of purpose which prevailed when the Community was created.
Absent a decision-making process based on a better balance between the
contributions made by all the institutions, the Community would never
regain its dynamism or live up to the expectations of the people of
Europe.' 90
181 Id. at 35.
182 Id. at 47.
183 Id. at 51.
184 Id. at 78.
185 Id. at 79.
18 6

Id. at 77.

187
188
189
190

Id. at 79.
Id. at 81.
Id.
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, COMMISSION REPORT ON THE MANDATE OF

MAY 30, 1980 12, 21 (June 24, 1981).
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8. Investiture Resolution of the European Parliamentof 1981
On February 12, 1981 the European Parliament adopted a resolution approving the appointment of the Commission and reiterating its
request to participate in the future in that exercise. 19 '
9. InstitutionalDebate in the European Parliamentin July 1981
In its July 7 to 9, 1981 session, the European Parliament tackled the
subject of relations between the institutions. The thread running through
all the reports and draft resolutions was a resolve to recast relations between the institutions so as to give Parliament more power.1 92 Two approaches emerged during the debate. The first, a policy of "small steps"
or proposals aimed initially at improvements within the bounds of the
existing Treaties was reflected in resolutions on Parliament's right of initiative and its role in the legislative process. 193 The second approach,
advocated by the EP members of the so-called "Crocodile Club," was
aimed at recasting relations between the institutions by means of a revision of the Treaties.' 94 To this end the EP decided to set up a standing
Committee on institutional problems.' 95
10. French Memorandum of October 1981
In October 1981, the French Government sent to the member states
and the EC institutions a memorandum on the revitalization of the Community, which contained no institutional innovations. According to the
memorandum, the Community already has institutions with considerable
powers, and it is not necessary either to increase their powers or to alter
the balance between them. 196 Furthermore, it states that, "[w]ithin the
institutional framework laid down in the Treaties, an effort should be
made to improve the operation of the Community and cooperation be197
tween its institutions."'
In the institutional context, the French government stressed that a
more extensive application of the voting provisions in the Treaties would
enable the Council to make its decisions more quickly.' 98 France then
proposed that the President should call for a vote where prescribed by
the Treaty, on the understanding that voting could be deferred if one or
191 Id. at 3.
192 Id.
193 14 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 2) 48-49 (1981).
194 14 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 7/8) 66 (1981).

195 15 GEN. REP. EUR. COMM. 25 (1981).
196 Id.
197

Id.

198 14 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 11) 93 (1981).
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more member states so requested in order to defend an essential national
interest. 9 9 The Memorandum stated that:
[i]t would also be useful to devote some attention to relations between the
Council and the European Parliament and the conditions under which Parliament carries out its role in the institutional complex. This review should
take into account the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the
budget in recent years and the European parliament's desire to play a more
active part in the Community's legislative process. Serious consideration
should also be given to relations between the European Parliament and the
national parliaments. 2°

11.

Commission Communication of October 14, 1981

In a communication to the Council and the European Parliament on
October 14, 1981, the Commission also commented on the role of the
European Parliament in the decision-making process. 20 1 Stressing the
importance of EP's role in this process, the Commission emphasized that
cooperation between Commission and Parliament in particular must not
be allowed to interfere with the responsibilities assigned specifically to
the Commission by the Treaties, namely the Commission's right to initiate Community legislation which is specified as one of the original and
cardinal features of the Community structure.2 0 2 The communication
stated that "[w]hile it is accordingly keen that Parliament should engage
in moves of its own, and fully intends to give these every possible support, the Commission feels it must also state forthrightly that parliamentary participation in the actual decision-making process cannot be other
than at the expense of the Council's quasi-monopoly of this. ' 20 3 With
regard to the legislative power of the EP, this document seems somewhat
ambiguous. On the one hand the Commission expresses the feeling that,
on the whole, existing procedures provide Parliament with the means of
acquiring a fair measure of influence. 2° Yet, on the other hand, the
Commission feels "that any new treaty should define the direction in
which Parliament's powers should be extended, providing in particular
for Parliament to be given certain legislative powers .
. .25
12.

Genscher-Colombo Proposals

On November 19, 1981, the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Gen199 Id. at 100.
200 Id.
201 Id.

202 Id.

203 The InstitutionalSystem of the Community, 15 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 3) 8 (Supp. 1982).

204 Id. at 8-9.
205 Id.
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scher, and the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Colombo, presented to the
European Parliament their respective governments' proposals for a "European Act" and a draft declaration on economic integration.2" 6 This
initiative by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy was the extension on the institutional level of the proposals for the consolidation of
Community policies made by the French Government in its memorandum of October. 207 In the Genscher-Colombo Report the following
points merit attention: (1) closer links between Council meetings and
meetings of ministers to promote greater political cooperation within the
limits imposed by existing procedures and without making any amendments to the Treaties; (2) careful consideration of the question of voting
in the Council; and (3) improvement of relations with the European Parliament. 20 8 However, the follow-up of this report, the Summit of Stuttgart, held from June 17 to 19, 1983, has been rather disappointing.
Mention already has been made of the fact that the situation in the Council with regard to the voting procedure has continued to deteriorate since
this summit.20 9 With respect to the Council/Parliament relation, the position adopted by the EP itself is significant. On June 30, 1983, the EP
adopted a resolution expressing disappointment at the outcome of the
210
Stuttgart Summit.
13.

Conclusions

In conclusion the proposals summarized above are in varying degrees concerned with the relation between the Council, the Commission
and the European Parliament. What is striking about them is that only
the Vedel Report and the reports of the Economic and Social Committee
and the European Parliament emphasize in fairly strong language the
need to grant legislative power to the EP. The other proposals, in contrast, are silent on this point. The Commission holds a somewhat ambiguous position, 211 and the recent German/Italian proposals for a
"European Act" 2 12 contain, in fact, no real legislative responsibilities for
the European Parliament2" 3 which is confirmed by the Summit of Stutt206 Id. at 9. See also id. at 11.
207 Id. at 12.

208 14 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 11) 10 (1981). The texts of the two drafts are reproduced in this
bulletin at pages 87-91.
209 15 GEN. REPORT EUR. COMM. 25 (1981).

210 15 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 2) 53 (1982); see also A. LAREDO, 2 INTEGRATION ET
DEMOCRATIE 73-75 (1982).

211 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
212 16 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 105 (1983).
213 See supra notes 201-205 and accompanying text. Such an ambiguous position also appears in
the recent report of E. Cerexhe, Rapport sur l'Avenier Institutionneldes CommunautesEuropeennes
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gart in its declaration on European Union. 214 The partisans of legislative
powers for the EP suggest in fact that the position of the European Parliament in terms of legal status and formal powers should be equal to that
of any other Western European national assembly.2 15
C.

Arguments Against Granting Legislative Power to the European
Parliament
1.

The Trias Politica of Montesquieu

The principle that a parliament should be equipped with legislative
power goes back to the ideas of Charles de Secondat, Baron of Brede and
Montesquieu, expressed in his book, De I'Esprit des Lois, published in
1748, and in particular chapter VI of the eleventh book, De la Constitution de l'Angleterre.216 In this chapter, Montesquieu distinguishes three
powers in the state; the legislative, the executive and the judicial
power.2 17 Political freedom 2 18 can only exist, says Montesquieu, if these
three powers are separated.2 19 The legislative power in the proper
sense 220 should be given to the people or its representatives 22 1 with a veto
for the nobility.22 2 The legislative power should also have the capacity to
control the execution of the laws, 2 2 3 while the executive power, in turn,
should take part in the legislature by a right of veto.224 In this way, a
balance of powers will be established which will prevent abuse of
power.225 Montesquieu's theory of the triaspolitica has exercised an important influence on the constitutions established in the 18th and 19th
centuries, in particular on the Constitution of the United States which
embodies this concept of separation of powers.22 6 Such a strict divorce of
dans la Perspectice d'un Enlargissement, 1982

AssoCIATION

DES

INSTITUS

D'kTUDES

EUROPEENNES 57 (1982).
214 Id.

at 52.

215 EUROPE (No. 3532) Jan. 24/25, 1983, at 1.
216 16 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 102 (1983).

217 See COMMITTEE OF THREE REPORT,SUpra note 6, at 74; T. HARTLEY, SUpra note 145, at 18,
25.
218 E. LABOULAYE, OEUVRES DE MONTESQUIEV (1875) [hereinafter cited as E. LABOULAYE].
219 Id.

vol. 11, at 4.

220 Often it is forgotten that what Montesquieu means by "political freedom" only refers to the
freedom which is achieved by providing in the constitution a certain degree of separation of the three
powers and not the freedom in connection with the rights of citizens, which is discussed in volume
12. See id. vol. 11, at 1.
221 E. LABOULAYE,supra note 218, vol. 11, at 8-11.
222 Legislative powers is defined as the faculty to make statutes. Id. at 14.
223 E. LABOULAYE, supra note 218, vol. 11, at 11.

224 Id. at 14.
225 Id.

at 17.

226 Id.

at 19.
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the executive from the legislature does not exist, however, in the West
European parliamentary systems.2 2 7
Moreover, the theory of the triaspolitica is now obsolete in Western
Europe for several reasons.2 2 8 In the first place, a pure separation of
powers, in the sense that one organ can only exercise one power, is not
quite possible. Even in the Constitution of the United States the strict
separation of powers is mitigated by the Presidential veto and by his right
to propose legislation. 2 9 Second, the numerous functions of the modem
welfare state cannot be described and understood if we start only from
the three powers of Montesquieu.
In Montesquieu's scheme, the executive power is limited to the execution of the laws adopted by Parliament, but modem government covers much more than "execution of laws."21 3 In modern times the rulemaking process has changed fundamentally in two respects. On the one
hand, the legislator leaves the framing, amplification, refining and continuous adaptation of general rules in the hands of the executive.2 3 1 On the
other, rules in the sense of the totality of binding decisions do not have to
be made through passing laws. 32 The result has been that Parliament
retired as a legislator and cleared the way for the phenomenon of an
increasing delegation with "FreiesErmessen" for the administration and
more and more "Unbestimmte Gesetzesbegriffe .,,33 Finally, the separa' 2 34
tion of powers according to the trias politica in a "watchman-state
does not fit in modem welfare states, in which there exist not three but
various powers influencing government including, but not limited to,
pressure-groups, trade unions, multinational companies and the civil
service. 2351
227 Id. at 5.
228 U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (the legislative power); id. art. II, § 1 (the executive power); id. art.
III, § 1 (the judicial power).
229 See G. SMITH, POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE 128 (1972); S. FINER, FIVE CONSTITUTIONS
22 (1979).
230 As early as 1829, Mohl, the German constitutionalist called this theory a theoretical mistake
with many disadvantegeous consequences to society and science. R. MOHL, I DAS STAATSRECHT
DES KONIGSREICHES WURTEMBERG 22 (1829).
231 W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (1977).
232 See B. JEANNEAU, DROIT CONSTITUTIONAL ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES 97 (1981) [here-

inafter cited as B. JEANNEAU]. Illustrative of this evolution is the new Dutch constitution that came
into force on February 17, 1983. This new constitution does not superceed the old provisions concerning the executive power of the King, but contains a new provision (art. 89, para. 4), which
recognizes the necessity of delegation by the formal legislator to the government.
233 INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WETGEVINGSVRAAGSTUKKEN STAATSUITGEVERIJ

10 (1982).
234 G. SMITH, supra note 229, at 203.
235 Macht en onmacht van de wetgever, in OPSTELLEN 70 (1978) (written for the occasion of the
15th Anniversary of the Law Faculty of Tilburg).
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2. The European Communities and the Rule of Law
Some elements of the ideas of Montesquieu have been adopted by
the West European idea of the "Rechtsstaat."236 It is worth mentioning
here, as far as the institutional aspects are concerned, the principle of
balance of powers in the State as a guarantor of individual freedom and
pluriform democracy, 23 7 together with the principle of "legality" which
allows the State to restrict freedom of the citizens so long as the laws are
applied equally to everybody and accepted by Parliament.2 3 8
The principle of balance of power between the state powers also
takes shape on the level of the European Communities. But here it is
applied differently than at the national level and it is implemented less
rigorously than as prescribed by the Treaty. The Community does not
have three institutions for three powers as is the case at the national level,
butfour institutions (Council, Commission, EP and the Court of Justice)
dealing with three powers (legislation: the Council, 239 executive: the
Commission, 2' and the judiciary: the Court of Justice 241 ) and a tradition of strong cooperation among the several branches.2 42 So, in the
Community we are not dealing with a separation of powers in the sense
of Montesquieu's trias, but rather with a dual balance between the Council (legislature) and the Commission (executive) on the one hand and
24 3
between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, on the other.
3.

The DemocraticDeficit in the European Community

As a result of this lack of effective parliamentary participation insufficient justice is done to the priniple of legality as well as to the principle
of democracy. Statements like "parliamentary deficit '" 2 " or "a weak
democratic legitimation ' 24 5 have been'used to characterize the European
Parliament's role with respect to the Community's legislation. FurtherB. JEANNEAU, supra note 232, at 97.
See de Latour, Le Songe de Montesquieu, LE MONDE, Jan. 20, 1983, at 2.
238 The original German term "Rechtsstaat" was introduced in 1829 by Mohl in his book DAS
STAATSRECHT DES KONIGSREICHS WURTTEMBERG (1928). Its principle is that the relation between the state and citizen is not a relation of power but of law. This relation should be governed by
statutes and by principles of law such as the fundamental rights that are defined in the Constitution.
The term has never been translated and, although there are important differences between both, it an
be compared with the British concept of "rule of law.".
239 Cf B. JEANNEAU, supra note 232, at 13.
240 Ballin, De Mens in de Sociale Rechtsstaat, in OVERHEIDSBUNDEL 30 (1982).
241 See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 145.
242 See id. art. 155.
243 See id. art. 164.
244 See id. arts. 149, 189.
245 K. VOGEL, GEETZGEBER UND VERWALTUNG 176 (1976) (Veroffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, Heft 24, 1966); H. IPSEN, supra note 69, at 223-24.
236
237

Decision-Making in the EEC
5:902(1983)
more because of this democratic deficit the technocratic element in the
Community's decision-making gains the advantage. 246 Ipsen has noted
that the practical development of the Community's decision-making system has had two consequences for democratic control.2 4 7 On the one
hand minimal democratic control prescribed by the Treaty, for example,
the control of the European Parliament over the Commission, has weakened through the undermining of the Commission's position and the attendant reinforcement of the executive power in the member states. 248
On the other hand the loss of legislative control suffered by the national
parliaments-a result of the activities of the Communities-has not been
compensated by a proportional expansion of the powers of the European
Parliament.2 49 Thus, according to Ipsen, "the gap in democratic legitimation remains open at the level of the Community, while it increases at
the national level.", 250 This democratic deficit in the decision-making process of the European Communities leads back to the crucial question in
the second part of this essay which is, should national parliamentarism
be the norm for "parliamentarism" in the European Community?
4.

Traditionalor Modern Parliamentarism?

Van Schendelen distinguishes between a traditional and a modem
science of parliament. 251' The former is largely normative and entertains
the idea that parliaments have a number of characteristic functions
which can be narrowly defined. Traditional parliamentarism emphasizes
particularly the importance of the three norms of representation, legislation and control.2 5 2 Modem parliamentarism does not deny that parliaments can have representative, legislative, and control functions. It
postulates, however, that in general those are neither the sole nor the
most important functions of parliaments. The functions of a parliament
vary considerably according to political context and time.2 53 This distinction between a classical traditional parliamentarism on the one hand
and a modem undogmatic parliamentarism on the other can be useful in
246 Koupmans, De Europese Gemeenschappen en het Nederlandse Staatsbeskl, 1980 REcHTSGELERD MAGAZUIN THEMIS (No. 4/5) 371.

247 Timmermans, EEG Harmonistatieen Nederlands Recht: Een Beeld Van Bewogen Beweging,
RECHTSGELERD MAGAZUN THEMIS (No. 4/5) 425 (1980).

248 Id.
249 H. IPSEN, supra note 69, at 1033-34.
250 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
251 H. IPsEN, supra note 69, at 1030, 1033.
252 Id. at 1034.
253 Van Schendelen, Het Parlement, in VERKENNINGEN IN DE POLITIEK 168 (4. Hoogerwerf ed.
1976).
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answering the question whether or not national parliamentarism should
be the norm for the European Community.
Undoubtedly, the founding fathers of the European integration were
inspired by the classical approach. They were thinking in terms of a federated Europe governed by an independent commission, represented by a
parliament directly elected by the people and federal states represented
by a council. 4 In the 1950s, the classical division between a truly executive government, a truly legislative parliament and a constitutional
court of justice was the ideal.25 5 As late as 1975, Sassen felt that the
reinforcement of democratic legitimation in the Community would come
from the granting of co-legislative power to the European parliament. At
the same time Parliament would exercise political control over those
Community institutions holding the executive power, including the
Council of Ministers.2 56 The current view that the European parliament
should have colegislative powers can only be explained in the light of a
classical parliamentarism. Modem parliamentarists in contrast to their
classical counterparts are more likely to take a critical, rather than a
dogmatic view of parliament as a representative institution in the current
political system.
5.

Parliamentand Legislation

There was growing realization as early as 1916 that parliaments
257
were becoming less and less able to cope with their legislative tasks.
Today, the parliament is not only incapable of functioning as legislature
in the classical sense, but the development of the social welfare state has
caused a shift in emphasis from parliament to government. 25 Furthermore, the transition of the liberal watchman state to the social welfare
state has affected the character of legislation itself.25 9 First, the nature of
"formal" legislation has changed drastically. Formal law actually no
longer functions as the source of detailed regulations, but rather as an
institution which grants lower governmental and administrative bodies
254 Id.
255 Id. at 171.

256 Koopmans, Euro-Verkiezingen: Symbool of Panacee, 1978 SOCIAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING (No. 1) 6.
257 Homan, Het Verdrag Tot Oprichting van de EEG: Enige Herinneringenaan de Voorbereidingen 1955-1957, INT'L SPEC., Mar., 1982, at 168; see also J. MEGRET, LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 6 (Institut d'Etudes Europ~ennes Universite Libre de

Bruxelles No. 9, 1979).
258 Sassen, Politiek, Parlementen Democratie in de Europese Gemeenschap, in DUYNSTEE, POLiTIEK, DEMOCRATIE 204 (1975).

259 Burkens & Stroink, Sociale Verzorgingsstaat en Consensuele Besluitvoming, 1980 N.J.B. 74350.
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authority to spell out detailed regulations.26 0 At the same time administrative agencies have gradually acquired extensive powers through numerous administrative legislations which have penetrated all parts of
society. 26' The government increasingly imposes legal regulations (a system of licenses) or creates legal claims as well as financial allowances
(social benefit and subsidies). As a result, citizens depend less on directly
elected bodies and more and more on institutions, which only have a
derived legitimacy, for the definition of their rights and duties.2 62
This evolution of the legislative function of parliament has taken
place in all the West European countries. Writing in 1974, Klaus von
Beyme noted very clearly that "[i]t is unanimously agreed in almost all
the national studies that the legislative function has increasingly degenerated to a bill reviewing role."' 263 This reduction, if not the complete disappearance of the legislative function of parliament, can be considered as
one of the aspects of the decline of parliament in general. 264 Thus a curious discrepancy has developed between the government's exercise of authority which underwent fundamental changes and the structure of
decision-making which has hardly changed since the nineteenth century.

6. Parliamentand Economic Decision-Making
Another important aspect of this development is that it clearly
brings to light that parliament in its function as co-legislator can hardly
assert itself in the making and execution of economic policy. Governments negotiate about basic aspects of economic policy with organized
trade and industry and the agreements resulting from these negotiations
are then presented to parliament as afait accompli .265 The fact that parliament has next to no influence on this policy is in itself not surprising
given that its classical repertory of powers is based on the nineteenth
century presupposition of a highly developed civil economic self-suffi260 Id. at 743.
261 Id. at 745.
262 Id. at 746.

263 K. Von Beyme, Basic Trends in the Development of the Functions of Parliament in Western
Europe, in EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE FUTURE OF PARLIAMENTS IN EUROPE 16, a symposium held at Luxembourg by the European Parliament, May 2-3, 1974, (published by the Office for
Official Publications of the European Community 1975). G.S. Reid underscores Parliament's failure
to meet its responsibilities in legislation in Reid, The Parliament in Theory and Practice, in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: ESSAYS ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION,CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 37-55 (M. James ed. 1982).
264 B. JEANNEAU, supra note 232, at 102.

265 Geelhoed, Democratie en Economische Orde in de Verzorgingsstaat, in BEDRIIVEN IN
MOEILUJKHEDEN 1981 244 (1982).
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ciency which was only occasionally curbed by the state. 6 6
The assumption that all important decisions were taken in and by
the parliament could work in the liberal "watchman" state of the nineteenth century only because of the idea that governmental intrusion
should be restricted as much as possible in order to give maximum latitude to the free play of economic forces. In other words, parliament has
not lost power with regard to economic decision-making since it never
had such power.2 67 In view of this we may wonder whether the conditions in the West European states are still favorable for national parliamentarism or whether the problem is one of a reappraising parliament's
position and its tasks at the national level. Those who agree that such a
reappraisal is called for will scrutinize the system of the national separation of powers before simply imposing it on the European scene.2 68
7.

CommunitarianParliamentarism?

The wording of articles 137 and 138 of the Treaty and the change of
name of the European Parliament in 1962269 were fashioned after existing national classical parliamentary models.2 70 But these changes, as
Ipsen quickly adds, were undertaken "without recognizing the already
existing criticism of national parliamentarism, and without realizing the
functional changes of parliaments in their control of modern economic
and financial planning."2a7 ' This is the first communitarian reason to
question the wisdom of advocating national parliamentarism as the norm
for the European Community.
One of the other reasons that militates against an imitation of national parliamentarism at the Community level is the fundamentally different situation of the Community when compared to nation-states.
First, the development of the European dimension is still in its infancy
and nobody can predict what the institutional set-up will look like in the
end. Secondly, there are hardly any Community instruments yet for conducting an economic, monetary, or industrial policy. Therefore, nobody
has a clear view of which specific decision-making structure will be required for a European coordination of national policies;
266 Geelhoed, De Europese Unie, 1975 SOCIAAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING (No. 11) 702.
267 A. FRANSSEN, SOCIALISME EN DEMOCRATIC 425 (1976).
268 S. COUWENBERG, WESTERS STAATSRECHT ALS EMANCiPATIE-PROCES 54 (1977). See also
D.

COOMBES, THE POWER OF THE PURSE THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS IN BUDGET-

ARY DECISIONS (1976); D. COOMBES, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC POWER

(1982).
269 See supra note 28.
270 H. IPSEN, supra note 69, at 1034.
271 Id.
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The theory of the classical constitutional doctrine of the separation
of powers is of limited use for interstate organizations like the European
Community whose focus is on realizing certain clear cut goals. Hahn
therefore avoids the notion of "separation of powers".2 7 2 He prefers to
speak of "Funktionenund Funktionenteilung" where the European Communities are concerned. This avoids confusion with the concept belonging to the classical doctrine.2 73 There is evidence which suggests that
national parliamentary institutions have as yet been unable to solve
problems of an economic cooperation which transcend national borders.2 74 In such a situation it is not possible to transfer the institutions
and the distribution of powers of a liberal nineteenth century state to a
developing and as yet mainly economically oriented supranational Community. A traditional parliamentary system with its dualism between
government and opposition in the sense of varying majorities seems
hardly compatible with the specific demands and requirements of the
Community.2 7 5 In addition, the unique aspect of the existing treaty system-the cooperation between Council and Commission-which is extremely popular 27 6 is not compatible with the traditional trias politica
models of the Western European parliamentary systems.
Another reason for not adopting the classical model is the lack of
real European political parties. The existing European party federations
are artificial constructions. Since they are not based on shared ideas or
substantial agreement about European politics but exclusively on positions in national politics, they reflect national rather than European realities.27 7 Finally, the differences which exist between the parliamentary
systems in Western Europe should not be minimized. The constitutional
systems of the member states of the EC are not identical, 78 not to speak
of the different administrative cultures and styles as well as the differences in perceptions of the role of the state. 279 The unity and coherence
of administrative action in France, for example, stands in contrast to the
272 H.

HAHN,

FUNKTIONENTEILUNG

IM

VERFASSUNGSRECHT

EUROPAISCHER

ORGANISA-

TIONEN, 36-37 (1977).
273 Id.

274 Van Wijnen, Aspekten van en Kanttekeningen bi het Functionerenvan het Parlement, 1975
SOCIALISME EN DEMOCRATIE 97.

275 H. IPSEN,supra note 69, at 1045.
276 See, e.g., Solemn Declaration, 16 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 24, 26 (1983) (stating that "[t]he
application of the decision-making procedures laid down in the Treaties of Pans and Rome is of vital
importance in order to improve the European Community's capacity to act."
277 Brinkhorst, D'66 in de Nederlandse en Europese Politick van de Jaren Tachtig, CIvIs MUNDI,
Nov. 1979, at 253; see also H. IPSEN, supra note 69, at 1035.
278 F. RIDLEY, GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 13 (1979).
279 Id.
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divided administrative system in Britain. 28" The main differences relate
to the organization of the parliament in one or two houses, the participation in forming the government, the overthrow of the government by a
parliamentary vote and the dissolution of parliament. 28 Thus, even if
one were to start from a traditional parliamentary model, the problem of
deciding which national Western European parliamentary system should
be taken as the starting point remains a critical one. In this situation
reflection on a new institutional model for the European Communities is
more productive then a blind imitation of national systems.28 2
D.

Conclusions

In the European Community, a classical separation and balance of
powers has not materialised. There are constitutional checks and balances in the EC but they cannot be compared with those of national
states.283 Hence comparison with national models, including national
federal models, are odious.2 84 Caution should be exercised when advancing the thesis that the treaties are in many respects similar to the national
constitutions and can therefore be considered "the constitution" of the
European Community. 28 5 The scientific view regarding the future balance of power in the EC is that a development simply based on Montesquieu's theory should definitely be rejected.28 6
In addition, we should avoid looking upon the powers of the European Parliament as a reflection or a reproduction of the prerogatives of
national parliaments.28 7 It would, for various reasons, be a fundamental
mistake to impose the principles, notions, and structures of traditional
national parliamentarism on the European scene primarily because of the
changes which have occurred during the transition process from a liberal
to a social "Rechtsstaat." '2 8 8 We have seen that in the socio-economic
domain, the influence of parliament has waned. In view of this there is
every reason to reconsider the function of the European Parliament
280 Id. at 73.
281 See G. SMITH, supra note 229, at 328-29 (European constitutional comparison).
282 H. IPSEN, supra note 69, at 1043.
283 H. HAHN, FUNKTIONENTEILUNG IM VERFASSUNGSRECHT EUROPAISCHER

ORGANISA-

37 n.112 (1977).
284 Koopmams, supra note 246, at 373-74.

TIONEN

285 p. MATHIJSEN, supra note 60, at 226.
286 See T. OPPERMAN & M. KILLIAN, VERGANGENHEIT UND ZUKUNFr DES EUROPAISCHEN
PARLAMENTS 390 (1981).
287 E. CEREXHE, LE DROIT EUROPEEN-LES INSTITUTIONS 154 (1979); S.COUWENBERG, WESTERS STAATSRECHT ALS EMANCIPATIEPROCES 54
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before reaching for the classical competencies.2" 9 The same holds true for
the legislative powers of the European Parliament at a time when the
national parliaments are handing over more and more of their power to
other bodies. On the European scene, a legislative veto-right of the EP
would add, moreover, an extra obstacle to the existing decision-making
procedure. A second reason for rejecting classical parliamentarism is
that the existing national parliamentary devices might be unsuitable for
an arrangement like the Community which is still in the making and in
which the pursuit and control of economic power are central issues. Another reason is that, at the moment, we can only speculate about the final
outcome of the Community and it would, to say the least, be premature
to thwart the unexplored possibility of a pluralist political structure.2
In all likelihood a balance of power-which is not modeled on any example in the known state organizations-will be achieved between Commis291
sion, Council and European Parliament.
Some authors contemplate whether constitutional developments at
both the national and international levels do not tend in the direction of
the separation of two powers. In particular, the separation between the
legislative and executive on the one hand and the judiciary on the other.
Such a separation is already apparent in the European Community.2 9 2
Ipsen goes even further when he argues that the new EEC model is possibly better suited for modern government tasks, and that those who adhere to the national separation of powers can learn from it. 293 The call
for a reconsideration of the basic constitutional notions 294 thus acquires a
new impulse from the European point of view. Hence for the European
Community it seems most adequate to maintain a "dialektische Verfassungspolitik, ' ' 295 which leaves the future form of European parliamentarism open, and does not rigidly impose national parliamentary
constructions. The conclusion here is that expansion of the European
Parliament's legislative power is not in accordance with the constitutional developments in the member states.
From the preceding analysis it follows that the fundamental failure
of the institutional system of the Community lies in the uneasy relations
between the Council and the Commission. The Commission's position
has been undermined, resulting in a dependent relation with the Council.
289 Geelhoed, supra note 266, at 682.
290 H. IPSEN, supra note 69, at 997.
291 p. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT II, supra note 40, at 507.

292 See Vogel, supra note 245, at 176.
293 H. IPSEN,supra note 69; at 223-24.
294 S. COUWENEERG, DE AMSTREDEN STAAT 100 (1975).
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The logical remedy would seem then to be a reestablishment of the institutional balance between Council and Commission as laid down in the
Treaty. This means that the Commission must reassert its independent
role of an arbiter as the treaty provides while the Council, which is now
too much the focus of all the Community's activities, must take a step
backward. A greater coherence, independence and authority for the
Commission will be necessary. The institutional balance will, however,
not be fortified as long as the EP establishes itself as a link between the
Council and Commission. The European Parliament should not forget
that its own power of control will be reinforced to the extent that the
position of the Commission is reestablished. In other words, the EP and
the Commission are natural allies in the decision-making process of the
EC and the indicated tendencies in the European Parliament could affect
this relationship adversely.
This does not mean that the European Parliament should not occupy a more important place than it presently does. Recently Roger
Morgan mentioned five types of functions for the elected European Parliament; representation, control over the executive, policy making, planning and external relations.2 96 The current President of the European
Parliament, Piet Dankert, has emphasized that the most important task
for the EP is to convince Europeans that their main socio-economic
problems cannot be solved by national approaches. 29 7 The EP should
strengthen its position as a sounding board for and a stimulator of public
opinion in the Community. 298 Nevertheless, whatever the merits of the
above arguments, the proper function of the EP should be determined on
the basis of separate standards which are not derived from the classical
categories of national states.

296 Morgan, Nieuwe Taken Voor het Europese Parlement, INT'L SpEc., Nov. 1979, at 676-81.
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298 Vedel Report, supra note 14, at 34; see also D. COOMBES, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
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